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J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Strike
Two for the Peremptory Challenge
'Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of
any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well
educated."l
"'If counsel is depending upon a clearly applicable rule of law
and if he wants to avoid a verdict of 'intuition' or 'sympathy,'
if his verdict in amount is to be proved by clearly demonstrated
blackboard
figures for example, generally he would want a male
2
juror.'"

I. INTRODUCTION

As the above quotes demonstrate, and as acknowledged by the
Supreme Court, African-Americans and women share a long history of
exclusion from jury service.3 The peremptory challenge is one device
that attorneys have traditionally used to exclude individuals in these
groups from a jury panel.4 African-Americans receive protection from
the peremptory challenge as a result of Batson v. Kentucky, 5 which
held that race-based peremptory challenges violate both defendants'
and excluded jurors' equal protection rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6
Batson left open the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment
also prohibits gender-based peremptory strikes. The Supreme Court
answered this question in 1994 with J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.7
Applying heightened equal protection scrutiny,8 the Court determined
that gender-based peremptory challenges violate the equal protection
rights of both defendants and excluded jurors. 9

1. Race Bias Pervades Jury Selection, Study Finds, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 9,
1986, at A28 (quoting uncited jury selection treatise) (quoted in Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 104 n.3 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
2. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 n.10 (1994) (omission in
original) (quoting 3 MELVIN M. BELLI, SR., MODERN TRIALS §§ 51.67, 51.68, at 446-47
(2d ed. 1982)).
3. See id. at 1425.
4. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 83; see also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
5. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
6. Id. at 89.
7. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
8. See infra notes 97-99 for discussions of the three possible levels of scrutiny:
rational basis scrutiny, intermediate level scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.
9. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1427-29.
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This Note critically analyzes the J.E.B. decision. First, it explains
the jury selection procedure.' ° It then reviews the cases leading up to
J.E.B. which demonstrate how African-Americans and women were
excluded from juries in the past." This Note then examines the split in
the lower courts over the application of Batson to gender exclusions. 2
Next, this Note discusses and critically analyzes the facts and opinions
in J.E.B.' 3 and its probable impact.' 4 Finally, this Note concludes that
the Supreme Court's latest decision is another step toward the elimination of the peremptory challenge. 5
II.BACKGROUND
The "jury is a remarkable political institution."' 6 Trial by jury
existed in England for centuries before the drafting of the United States
Constitution.'" A trial by jury protects against government oppression'8 because ordinary citizens become part of the judicial s ,stem and
"can prevent its arbitrary use or abuse."' 9 Furthermore, it is fundamental to the American system of democracy.2' "Indeed, with the
exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury
duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process." 2 ' It empowers the people and provides them with a
means to direct society.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra part II.A.
See infra part II.B-D.
See infra part II.E.
See infra parts Il-IV.
See infra part V.
See infra part VI.

16. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 3 (1966).

17. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (citing 4 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *349).

18. Id. at 155 (citing Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965)).
19. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922), quoted in Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 406 (1991); see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156. The Duncan Court explained:
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it
was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to
eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher
authority. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent
judiciary but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.
Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him
an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
Id.
20. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (stating that "[e]qual opportunity to participate in the
fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system").
21. Id. (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 407).
22. Powers, 499 U.S. at 407 (quoting 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN

19951

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.

A. Jury Selection
Jury selection is a gradual process which begins with a large pool of
potential jurors summoned to the courthouse. 23 Not every juror summoned in a case is selected to serve.24 Potential jurors comprise the
jury "venire."25 In a process called "voir dire, 26 both the judge and
attorneys question the jury venire. 7 The judge may then exercise a
"challenge for cause" and remove a juror for specific reasons, which
may include partiality. 28 The "peremptory challenge," 29 on the other
hand, is available to attorneys.30 By definition, an attorney can
exercise a peremptory challenge for any reason and without explanation. 3' After each side exercises its peremptory challenges, the
AMERICA

334-37 (Schocken 1st ed. 1961)).

23. In federal courts, potential jurors are randomly chosen from a list of voters.

JON
M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
Most states also select potential jurors from
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 86 (1977).

standard lists. Id. at 85-86.

24. Id. at 86.
25. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990). "Venire" is defined as "[t]he
group of citizens from whom a jury is chosen in a given case. Sometimes used as the
name of the writ for summoning a jury, more commonly called a 'venire facias."' Id.
26. Id. at 1575. "Voir dire" is defined as "the preliminary examination which the
court and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their qualification[s] and
suitability to serve as jurors." Id.
27. Attorneys are allowed to question jurors at the discretion of the trial judge.
Potential jurors are questioned on a variety of matters including religious beliefs, jobs,
and hobbies. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 158

(1989).
28. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) overruled in part by Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). "[C]hallenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a
narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality.... .Swain,
380 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
29. "Peremptory challenge" is defined as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without
assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (setting forth the rule in criminal cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1870
(1988) (setting forth the number of challenges each party is entitled to in civil cases).
31. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (calling the peremptory
challenge "an arbitrary and capricious right" (quoting Lamb v. State, 36 Wis. 424
(1874))).
Over 70 years later, the Swain Court had a similar impression of the peremptory
challenge:
The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the
court's control ....

It is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally

thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race,
religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury
duty.
380 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
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remaining jurors form the "petit jury ' 3 2 which the court empanels to
serve and decide the case.
B. A History of Exclusion: The African-American
African-Americans secured rights in the United States gradually. 33
In 1856, the Supreme Court held, in the infamous case of Dred Scott
v. Sandford,3 1 that the rights and privileges granted by the Constitution did not apply to African-Americans. In this nineteenth century
decision, decided prior to the United States Civil War and the passage
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court reasoned that
African-Americans were property, not citizens.36 Five years after the
addition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution,37 however,
the Slaughter-HouseCases38 observed that the Fourteenth Amendment
overturned Dred Scott.39 Consequently, African-Americans and other
minorities were declared citizens.'
Nevertheless, African-Americans still had to fight for certain rights,
including the right to serve as jurors and to have impartial juries. In
1879, the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia41 invalidated a
state statute which permitted only white men to act as jurors.42 In this
landmark case, the Court reasoned that forcing individuals to be tried
by a group from which members of their race are explicitly banned
offended the very idea of a jury of peers43 and denied the defendant
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (6th ed. 1990). "Petit jury" is defined as "[tihe
ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal action." Id.
33. See generally HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL
DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (James A. Fox & Joseph Weis eds.,
1993) (presenting a thorough historical analysis of African-Americans as jury
members).
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
35. Id. at 411.
36. Id. at 411, 450-51.
37. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
39. See id. at 80-81.
40. See id.
41. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
42. Id. at 308.
43. Id. "The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of
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equal legal protection. 4 The Court also considered the rights of
excluded jurors and stated that exclusion based solely on color was an
"assertion of their inferiority."
Strauderproved to be a limited victory, however, because states
subsequently employed an array of devices to prevent African-Americans from actually serving on juries. 46 The Supreme Court's reaction
to such tactics varied from case to case.47

the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds." Id.
44. Id. at 309. In its analysis, the Court kept the main purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause in mind. Id. at 310. The West Virginia statute
was at odds with the aim of protecting against race or color discrimination:
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white man is
entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color, or,
rather, selected without discrimination against his color, and a negro is not,
the latter is equally protected by the law with the former. Is not protection of
life and liberty against race or color prejudice, a right, a legal right, under the
constitutional amendment? And how can it be maintained that compelling a
colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from
which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color
alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal
legal protection?
Id. at 309-10.
45. Id. at 308.
46. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 561-62 (1953) (determining that a
prima facie case of racial discrimination was established when jury members were
selected from a box of county tax returns, with names of whites printed on white tickets
and names of African-Americans printed on yellow tickets); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S.
282, 290 (1950) (holding that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was established
when jury commissioners only chose those they knew for grand jury service, and they
did not know any African-Americans).
47. See Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1920, 1923 n.27 (1992) [hereinafter Beyond Batson]. At first, the
Strauder Court's holding was enforced only "in truly extreme situations." Id. (quoting
VAN DYKE, supra note 23, at 60). Then, in Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), the
Court seemed willing to find racial discrimination in jury selection procedures. Beyond
Batson, supra, at 1923. The Norris Court held that statements by jury commissioners
that they did not consider race were insufficient to rebut a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Id. (citing Norris, 294 U.S. at 595, 598). After Norris, the Court
established conflicting standards for setting forth a prima facie case, id. (citing
Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 1026, 1030 (1987)), and it was once again difficult to prove racial
discrimination, id. (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1945) (no prima facie
showing, despite the fact that jury commissioners purposefully selected only one black
grand juror)). Compare with note 46, supra (citing two later cases in which the Court did
find that a prima facie case was established).
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In Swain v. Alabama,48 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of using peremptory challenges to prevent African-Americans
from serving as jurors. 49 Robert Swain was a nineteen-year-old
African-American accused of raping a white woman. 50 At Swain's
trial, the prosecutor utilized peremptory challenges to strike all six
eligible African-Americans. 1 In fact, no African-Americans had
served on any petit jury in the county for fifteen years.52 Swain
alleged that "invidious discrimination" in the selection of jurors
violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.53
The Swain Court explained that in any given case a court will presume that the prosecutor acted on tactical considerations related to the
case, the defendant, or the crime, 54 and that the prosecutor used the
peremptory challenge to "obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the
case." 55 This presumption is based on the notion that the peremptory
challenge has long been considered a vital means to achieve an impartial and qualified jury.5 6 Furthermore, prohibiting race-based
peremptory challenges would change the very nature of the strike as
one exercised for any reason.57 Given this history, and the desire to
48. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104
(1986). In Batson, the Court rejected the burden of proof that Swain established to
prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92. See infra
notes 54-63, 120-26, and accompanying text for a comparison of the burdens of proof
set forth in Swain and Batson.
49. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-24.
50. Id. at 203, 231.
5 1. Id. at 205.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 222-23. In support of his claim, Swain invoked Strauder v. West Virginia.
Id. at 203. Strauder invalidated a state statute which permitted only white people to
serve as jurors on the grounds that it contravened the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Id. (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308). See supra
notes 41-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Strauder.
54. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
55. Id. at 222.
56. Id. at 212-22. Justice White explained that "[w]hile challenges for cause permit
rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of
partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less
easily designated or demonstrable." Id. at 220 (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68,
70 (1887)). The peremptory challenges may be based on "'sudden impressions and
unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of
another."' Id. (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)). Thus, the
peremptory challenge is "one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and
without being subject to the court's control." Id. (citing State v. Thompson, 206 P.2d
1037 (Ariz. 1949); Lewis, 146 U.S. at 378). The Court went on to explain that counsel
has limited knowledge of venirepersons as individuals, so group affiliation is often used
as a reason to strike them. Id. at 221.
57. Id. at 221-22. The Court explained:
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preserve the nature of the peremptory challenge, the Court refused to
hold that the use of race-based peremptory challenges in any particular
case violated the constitutional mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment.58
This conclusion, however, was not dispositive on the issue of
whether it is constitutionally permissible to insulate from inquiry a
particular prosecutor's consistent and systematic exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from jury service
entirely. 59 Turning to that issue, the Court explained that the presumption that the prosecutor was motivated by permissible factors may
be rebutted with proof that the particular prosecutor was responsible
for excluding African-Americans "in case after case, whatever the
circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the
victim may be."' Such proof, the Court explained, might support an
inference that the prosecutor was using the peremptory challenge to
deny African-Americans the same right to participate in the administration of justice as white citizens.6 '
Although Swain demonstrated that no African-Americans had
served on a petit jury for fifteen years, the Court found this evidence
insufficient to raise an inference of systematic discrimination.62 In
fact, rebutting the presumption that the prosecutor acted legitimately
proved almost impossible.63
With these considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the striking of
Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws. In the
quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant and
Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without cause. To subject the
prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional
standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the
nature and operation of the challenge. The challenge, pro tanto, would no
longer be peremptory, each and every challenge being open to examination,
either at the time of the challenge or at a hearing afterwards. The prosecutor's
judgment underlying each challenge would be subject to scrutiny for
reasonableness and sincerity. And a great many uses of the challenge would be
banned.
Id.
58. Id. at 223.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 224 ("If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in
a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome.").
62. Id. at 227.
63. See Beyond Batson, supra note 47, at 1923. Only two cases successfully made a
prima facie case under the Swain standard. Id. at n.29 (citing State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d
751, 754 (La. 1979) (prima facie showing of discrimination established when the
prosecutor's race-based peremptory challenges were systematic, continuous, and
conscious); State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162, 1164-65 (La. 1979) (prima facie
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Therefore, for all practical purposes, the Fourteenth Amendment did
not ensure African-Americans access to the petit jury as of 1965.64
African-Americans had to wait until the Court's decision in Batson v.
Kentucky to gain complete access to serve as jurors. 65
C. A History of Exclusion: Women
Like African-Americans, women were also historically denied
access to jury service. Basically, courts held that allowing women to
serve as jurors conflicted with society's view of the "natural" roles set
for men and women. 66 Blackstone condoned the exclusion of women67
from jury service under "the doctrine of propter defectum sexus,,
which means "because not of the male sex," "defect of sex," or "not of
the right sex. 68 Furthermore, although the Court held in Strauder v.
West Virginia6 9 that states could not expressly exclude African-Americans from the jury, it specifically allowed states to exclude women.70

showing of discrimination established when the prosecutor's race-based peremptory
challenges were systematic, continuous, and conscious)). In Batson, the Court noted:
"[Tihe defendant would have to investigate, over a number of cases, the race of persons
tried in the particular jurisdiction, the racial composition of the venire and petit jury,
and the manner in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges." 476 U.S.
at 92 n.17 (quoting United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971)).
64. See, e.g., Michael J. Desmond, Note, Limiting a Defendant's Peremptory
Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum and the Problematic Extension of Equal Protection,
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 402 n.76 (1993) (pointing out that Swain did not prevent
prosecutors from striking minorities). Swain only put "theoretical limits" on the
peremptory challenge. Id. (quoting VAN DYKE, supra note 23, at 150). "Swain reduced
the requirement of nondiscrimination at earlier stages of the jury selection process to a
mere symbol." Alschuler, supra note 27, at 164.
65. See infra part I.D.
66. See JEANNE GREGORY, SEX, RACE AND THE LAW 13 (John Lea et al. eds., 1987)
(discussing the interplay of the struggles for racial and sexual equality).
67. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1423 (1994) (quoting United
States v. DeGross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoting 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362)).

68. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 263 (1986)
(discussing the jury system in light of the author's experiences as both a justice and as a
juror). A Massachusetts court's statement in 1932 demonstrates how society viewed
female jurors: "When they used the word 'person' . . . to describe those liable for jury
service, no-one contemplated the possibility of women becoming so qualified."
GREGORY, supra note 66, at 15 (quoting Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656, 661
(Mass. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1932)).
69. 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879).
70. Id. at 310. The Court explained: "It may confine the selection to males, to
freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational
qualifications." Id.
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It was not until 1946, in Ballard v. United States,7 " that the Supreme Court questioned the practice of limiting jury service to men.72
In this landmark case, the Court held that purposeful and systematic
exclusion of women from the jury venire in a federal case was
inconsistent with congressional intent to make the jury a cross section
of the community.73 In reaching this decision, the Court exercised its
supervisory power over federal courts rather than looking at constitutional grounds.74
Despite progress at the federal level, many states continued to
exclude women either explicitly or through structural conditions imposed on the jury selection process.7" In 1947, sixteen states simply
denied women the right to serve as jurors.76 Access in every state did
not occur until 1966, when Alabama, the last of the states to hold this
position, finally permitted women to serve as jurors.77 Many states,
however, then developed methods, such as registration requirements
and exemptions from jury service, to discourage women from actually
participating as jurors.78
In the 1947 case of Fay v. New York,7 9 the Supreme Court
approved a New York statute that permitted women to serve as jurors,
but which exempted them from jury service unless they volunteered to
serve.80 The defendants in Fay claimed that this exemption unfairly
narrowed the choice of jurors and denied women due process and
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 ' The Court held
that the Constitution supported neither the "contention" that women
should be on juries, nor that verdicts "unleavened by feminine influence" should be set aside. 2
71. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
72. Id. at 189-90.
73. Id. at 191-93. The Court explained that "Congress has provided that jurors in a
federal court shall have the same qualifications as those of the highest court of law in the
State." Id. at 190 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 411). Because California permits women to serve
as jurors, the Court believed Congress contemplated that federal juries sitting in that
state would include members of both sexes. Id. at 191.
74. Id. at 193.
75. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423.
76. Id. at 1423 n.3 (citing Wallace M. Rudolph, Women on the Juries-Voluntary or
Compulsory?, 44 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 206, 207 (1961)).
77. Abrahamson, supra note 68, at 269.
78. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 289 (1947);
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961)).
79. 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
80. Id. at 270.
81. Id. at 266.
82. Id. at 289-90.
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Similarly, in Hoyt v. Florida,83 only the names of women who
voluntarily registered appeared on the state's jury lists.84 As in Fay,
the Court found this affirmative registration constitutional.85 According to the Court, the requirement was reasonable in light of a
woman's position as "the center of home and family life.' ' 86 These
Supreme Court decisions indicate that while women were permitted to
serve as jurors, changing society's view of a woman's "natural role"
was a slow process.
Another attack on a state registration statute was levied in 1975 in
Taylor v. Louisiana.87 Taylor took advantage of the Court's holding
in Duncan v. Louisiana88 that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an
impartial jury 89 applied to the states. 90 The Court noted that since
1940, all relevant decisions held that the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial guarantees the "selection of a petit jury from a representative
cross section of the community." 9' Thus, the Court held that excluding women or requiring registration was unconstitutional if it
resulted in almost entirely male jury venires.92 In dicta, the Court
emphasized that it was not holding that the actual petit jury itself had to
mirror the community. 93 Thus, Taylor did not threaten the use of race83. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
84. Id. at 61.
85. Id. at 62.
86. Id.
87. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

88. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
89. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
90. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145).
9 1. Id. at 528.
92. Id. at 537.
93. Id. at 538. This is still the case today, according to the following list of cases
which, along with Taylor, will hereinafter be referred to as the "fair cross section cases."
See, e.g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (explaining that the Sixth
Amendment does not require that the petit jury be representative of the community)
(quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986)
(refusing "to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the
composition of the community at large"); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 n.20
(1979) (reiterating that the Sixth Amendment prohibits systematic exclusion in the
selection of the venire, but this does not mean that petit juries themselves must mirror
the community) (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538).
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based or gender-based peremptory challenges to exclude potential
jurors from the petit jury.94 Furthermore, a juror excluded from the
petit jury would have no claim because the Sixth Amendment only
applies to criminal defendants. 95
Importantly, during the time period of Taylor, the Court changed its
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause as it
applied to women.96 As a result of Craig v. Boren97 and other
landmark cases, 98 the Court applied a heightened scrutiny standard
when analyzing gender-based distinctions. 9 Thus, the Court required
that gender-based distinctions be substantially related to an important
government objective to withstand an equal protection challenge.'0°
Despite these decisions, and the inroads made by women in other
areas, the peremptory challenge remained. Women, like AfricanAmericans, could not realistically attack the peremptory challenge with
94. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480. In discussing the Sixth Amendment's fair-crosssection requirement, the Holland Court stated that "it has never included the notion that,
in the process of drawing the jury, the initial representativeness cannot be diminished
by allowing both the accused and the State to eliminate persons thought to be inclined
against their interests-which is precisely how the traditional peremptory-challenge
system operates." Id.
95. See supra note 89 for the text of the Sixth Amendment.
96. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1424.
97. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (settling on heightened scrutiny to hold that
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
98. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)
(holding that equal protection requires "exceedingly persuasive justification"); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny
to a statutory distinction between the sexes); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971)
(purporting to apply a traditional "rationality standard," the Court invalidated a genderbased classification).
99. See supra notes 97-98. In addition to heightened-level scrutiny, which is applied
when gender-based classifications exist, two other levels of equal protection scrutiny
exist. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
The first level is rational basis scrutiny, under which "[t]he general rule is that
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Id. at 440. There is also
strict scrutiny, which applies when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national
origin. Id. Such classifications will be permitted "only if they are suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest." Id. See also Rachel A. Brown, Note, Heller v. Doe:
The Supreme Court Diminishes the Rights of Individuals With Mental Retardation, 26
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 99, 122-25 (1994) (discussing the three levels of constitutional
scrutiny).
100. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. The Craig Court interpreted Reed as establishing that
statutes may be invalidated if gender is used as "an inaccurate proxy for other, more
germane bases of classification." Id. (construing Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76). Gender
classifications cannot be based on "archaic and overbroad" generalizations. Id. (quoting
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975)).
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the Equal Protection Clause due to the almost insurmountable burden
of proof imposed by Swain.'
D. Batson v. Kentucky: Abolishing the Exclusion
of African-Americans
In 1986, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court once again
considered the peremptory challenge. 0 2 Batson was accused of
second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 0 3 The prosecutor
used peremptory challenges to strike all four African-Americans from
the venire panel, leaving an all-white petit jury.'0 4 Batson argued that
this violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a
representative cross section of the community."5
Batson chose this strategy to avoid asking the Court to reconsider its
decision in Swain v. Alabama,'°6 in which the Court had explained
that it would presume that a prosecutor who excludes an AfricanAmerican juror has acted on tactical considerations related to that
particular case, defendant, or crime."°7 Granted, the Taylor Court had
previously refused to apply the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section
requirement to petit juries, but it did so only in dicta. 0 8 Surprisingly,
the Court overlooked Batson's Sixth Amendment claim, and instead
seized the opportunity to focus on equal protection and overrule
Swain's "crippling burden of proof."' 0 9
In Batson, the Court returned to the reasoning of Strauderv. West
Virginia,"o which held that the Equal Protection Clause did not permit
states to expressly exclude African-Americans from serving as
101. See Susan L. McCoin, Note, Sex Discrimination in the Voir Dire Process: The
Rights of Prospective Female Jurors, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1225, 1237-40 (1985)
(discussing Swain's application to cases involving both race-based and gender-based
peremptory challenges); see also supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Swain.
102. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
103. Id. at 82.
104. Id. at 83.
105. Id.
106. 380 U.S. 202; see supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
107. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 223). A defendant could only
overcome this presumption by showing that the particular prosecutor has engaged in a
case-by-case pattern of excluding black jurors. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223-24.
108. For a detailed discussion of the Court's holding in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975), see supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
109. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84, 92. The dissent criticized the majority on this point:
"In reaching the equal protection issue despite petitioner's clear refusal to present it, the
Court departs dramatically from its normal procedure without any explanation." Id. at
115 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
110. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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jurors."' The Court acknowledged that subsequent decisions usually
concerned discrimination during the selection of the jury venire, but
reiterated that Fourteenth Amendment protection applies throughout the
proceedings," 2 including selection of the petit jury." 3 States would
no longer be able to select the venire according to neutral procedures,
' 4
and then discriminate in "other stages in the selection process." "
Stressing that a defendant deserves a jury selected by nondiscriminatory criteria," 5 the Court held that peremptory challenges
based on race, or the assumption that African-American jurors will be
partial to defendants of the same race, violates a defendant's equal
protection rights." 6 In addition, the Court emphasized that race-based
exclusion from jury service (1) violates the potential juror's constitutional rights; 1 7 (2) diminishes public confidence in the justice
system;" 8 and (3) stimulates racial prejudice." 9
The Court put force behind its words by changing the "crippling
burden of proof' set by Swain. 20 Rather than showing a pattern by
the prosecutor in case after case, defendants can now point to facts in
their particular case in order to prove discrimination.' To make this
showing, the defendant must prove three elements.
First, the defendant must belong to a cognizable racial group and
members of that group must have been removed by peremptory
1 11. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-89 (citing with approval Strauder, 100 U.S. 303
(1879)).
112. Id. at88.
113. Id. at 88-89.
114. Id. at 88 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)) (citations
omitted).
115. Id. at 86-87.
116. Id. at 89. The dissent noted that the majority was not applying conventional
equal protection analysis. Id. at 123 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This would entail
asking if the racial classification was "suitably tailored to serve a compelling state
interest." Id. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). Chief Justice Burger indicated that the majority
avoided applying conventional equal protection analysis because Batson's claim would
fail due to the fact that the state's interest in peremptory challenges was "substantial, if
not compelling." See id. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 87. The Court noted that a person's race is simply "unrelated to his fitness
as a juror." Id. (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 88 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308). The Strauder Court described
discrimination in jury selection as "a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to
secure to all others." Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308.
120. Batson, 476 U.S. at 92.
121. Id. at 95. Cf. supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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challenges. 22 Second, the defendant may rely on the fact that
"peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate."" 23 Third,
the defendant must show that the exclusion and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of purposeful racial discrimination. 124 Once
a prima facie showing is made, the state may present a neutral
explanation to rebut the defendant's case. 25 Then, the trial court will
determine if purposeful discrimination has occurred. 26
In subsequent decisions, the Court interpreted Batson broadly. In
1991, in Powers v. Ohio,127 the Court decided that the defendant need
not belong to the same race as the excluded juror. 128 In Hernandez v.
New York, 129 the Court applied Batson to determine if peremptory
30
challenges were used to exclude Latinos because of their ethnicity.
Also in 1991, the Court applied Batson to civil cases in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co."3'
122. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)
(requiring the defendant to show that his group may be singled out for differential
treatment)).
123. Id. (quoting Avery, 345 U.S. at 562) (citations omitted).
124. Id. Relevant circumstances may include a pattern of strikes against AfricanAmerican venirepersons or statements and questions during voir dire. Id. at 97.
125. Id. It is not sufficient for the prosecutor to say he thought African-Americans
would be partial because they happen to share the race of the defendant, or that he did not
intend to discriminate. Id at 97-98. The Equal Protection Clause forbids acting on such
assumptions. Id.
126. Id. at 98.
127. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
128. Id. at 416. The Court considered whether a white defendant may object on
Fourteenth Amendment grounds when the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges
to remove African-American venirepersons. Id. at 404. The Court acknowledged that
Batson addressed the harm that defendants suffer when members of their own race are
excluded from the jury. Id. at 406. However, Batson also considered the rights of the
excluded juror and the community. Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 87). The Court held
"that race is irrelevant to a defendant's standing to object to the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges." Id. at 416.
129. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
130. Id. at 355. In Hernandez, the prosecutor claimed that he peremptorily struck two
bilingual Latino jurors because he was "uncertain that they would be able to listen and
follow the interpreter." Id. at 356-58. The Supreme Court accepted this explanation as
race-neutral, id. at 361, and held that the "trial court did not commit clear error in
choosing to believe the reasons given by the prosecutor," id. at 372.
131. 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991). The African-American plaintiff in Edmonson, a
negligence case, requested race-neutral explanations after Leesville Concrete Company
exercised two peremptory challenges to remove African-American venirepersons. Id. at
616-17. In determining that Batson applied, the Court explained that "[a]lthough the
conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution's scope in most instances,
governmental authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants
must be deemed to act with authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to
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Furthermore, in the 1992 case of Georgia v. McCollum,'3 the
133
Court subjected criminal defendants to the commands of Batson.
Here, the Court
characterized the use of peremptory challenges as
"state action."'' 34 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits both
prosecutors and defendants from discriminating on the basis of race in
exercising peremptory challenges.' 3 Indeed, the Court has consistently extended Batson's restraint on race-based peremptory
challenges to different types of litigants and cases. 136 In so doing, the
Court continuously pulled away from Swain's deference to the "old
credentials" of the peremptory challenge as "one exercised without a
reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's
control."'37
E. Application of Batson to Gender by Lower Courts
Following Batson, a conflict of authority arose in the federal
appellate courts over the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory
strikes.3 3 For example, in United States v. Hamilton,139 the Fourth
Circuit held that Batson did not apply to instances of peremptory
strikes based on gender.'O The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed in
United States v. DeGross.14' Relying on heightened scrutiny for
gender classifications, the Ninth Circuit concluded that peremptory
challenges are not "substantially related to the achievement of impor-

Constitutional constraints." Id. at 620; see also infra note 315 for a detailed discussion
of the Court's reasoning.
132. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
133. Id. at 2359.
134. Id. at 2355 (citing Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619-28). See infra note 315 and
accompanying text for a detailed discussion of the Court's reasoning on this point.
135. Id. at 2359.
136. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
137. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
138. Compare United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 218-20 (5th Cir. 1993)
(declining to extend Batson to gender); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038,
1042-43 (4th Cir. 1988) (declining to extend Batson to gender), cert. dismissed, 489
U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990) with United States v. De
Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1437-43 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (extending Batson to prohibit
gender-based peremptory challenges) and with United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257,
1262-64 (7th Cir. 1991) (declining to address the issue), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 989
(1992).
139. 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988).
140. Id. at 1042. "While we do not applaud the striking of jurors for any reason
relating to group classifications, we find no authority to support an extension of Batson
to instances other than racial discrimination." Id.
141. 960 F.2d at 1437-43.

564

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

tant government objectives."' 142 A similar split developed among state
courts.' 4a Finally, in 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided
to directly address the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory
challenges.' 44
III. DISCUSSION
Due to the aforementioned conflict of authority, 45 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 1" to decide
whether peremptory challenges made on the basis of gender, like race,
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 47 In a six-to-three decision, the
Court ruled the practice unconstitutional. 48 This is particularly true,
the Court determined, because gender-based peremptory challenges
rely on questionable stereotypes that have historically caused harm to
women as a class. 49

142. Id. at 1439 (citations omitted).
143. See, e.g., Di Donato v. Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr. 751 (Cal. Ct. App.), review
denied, No. S011963, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 4582 (Cal. Oct. 2, 1991); Laidler v. State, 627
So. 2d 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (extending Batson to gender); State v. Levinson,
795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) (extending Batson to gender); People v. Mitchell, 593
N.E.2d 882 (I11.App. Ct. 1992) (extending Batson to gender), affd in part and vacated
in relevant part, 614 N.E.2d 1213 (I11.1993); Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993)
(extending Batson to gender, relying on state constitution); Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 481 N.E.2d 188, 190 (Mass. 1985) (extending Batson to gender); State v.
Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App.) (extending Batson to gender), cert. denied, 806
P.2d 65 (N.M. 1991); People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(extending Batson to gender); State v. Burch, 830 P.2d 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(extending Batson to gender, relying on state and federal constitutions).
But see Murphy v. State, 596 So. 2d 42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (refusing to extend
Batson to gender), cert. denied, 596 So. 2d 45, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 86 (1992);
State v. Adams, 533 So. 2d 1060, 1063 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to extend Batson
to gender), cert. denied, 540 So. 2d 338 (La. 1989); State v. Clay, 779 S.W.2d 673, 676
(Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to extend Batson to gender); State v. Culver, 444 N.W.2d
662 (Neb. 1989) (refusing to extend Batson to gender); State v. Oliviera, 534 A.2d 867,
870 (R.I. 1987) (refusing to extend Batson to gender).
144. See infra part III.
145. See supra notes 138-44.
146. 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
147. 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1422 (1994).
148. Id.
149. Id. "Today we affirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection
Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate
invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women." Id. The Court's holding was limited to state actors. However, Justice
O'Connor predicted that J.E.B. would be extended to include defendants as state actors.
Id. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also infra note 189.
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A. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: The Facts and
Opinions Below
On behalf of the mother of a minor child, the State of Alabama
sought paternity and child support from J.E.B. 5 ° The jury venire
consisted of twelve males and twenty-four females.' 5 ' The court
excused three of the jurors for cause, leaving ten males and twentythree females. 52 The State used nine of its ten peremptory challenges
to strike males. 53 Likewise, J.E.B. used all but one of his perThe petit jury members were
emptory challenges
55 to strike females.'4
thus all female.
Before the court empaneled the jury, J.E.B. objected to the use of
the State's peremptory challenges, claiming that the State excluded
males solely on the basis of gender. 5 6 Applying Batson's prohibition
against race-based peremptory challenges to gender, J.E.B. argued
that the State 57violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1
The District Court rejected the defendant's argument and ruled that
Batson did not apply to gender.' 58 The all-female jury then concluded
that J.E.B. fathered the child and the court subsequently ordered him
to pay child support.' 59 The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
affirmed.' 6° The Supreme Court of Alabama denied certiorari.' 6'
B. The Opinion of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the appellate
court's ruling, holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids discrimination on the basis of gender in the
exercise of peremptory challenges. 162 Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun reviewed over one hundred years of the history of judicial

150. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1421-22.
153. Id. at 1422.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d 156, 157 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992),
cert. denied, No. 1911717, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 1296 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992).
161. Exparte J.E.B., No. 1911717, 1992 Ala. LEXIS 1296 (Ala. Oct. 23, 1992).
162. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
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treatment of women as jurors.'63 He explained that the express prohibition against female jurors in the United States originated at English
common law' 6 and that even when women were allowed to serve as
jurors,1 6 states designed barriers such as registration requirements and
automatic exemptions to deter women from actually serving."
The State claimed that gender discrimination had never reached the
67
level of race discrimination, and was therefore distinguishable.
Although Justice Blackmun refused to determine which group had
suffered more in history, 6 he expounded on the similarities between
race and sex discrimination. 169 He also explained that gender-based
163. Id. at 1422-25. "Gender-based peremptory strikes were hardly practicable for
most of our country's existence, since, until the 19th century, women were completely
excluded from jury service." Id. at 1422.
164. Id. at 1423. Justice Blackmun pointed out one exception:
If a woman was subject to capital punishment, or if a widow sought
postponement of the disposition of her husband's estate until birth of a child,
a writ de ventre inspiciendo permitted the use of a jury of matrons to examine
the woman to determine whether she was pregnant. But even when a jury of
matrons was used, the examination took place in the presence of 12 men, who
also composed part of the jury in such cases.
Id. at 1423 n.4 (citing Grace E. Woodall Taylor, Note, Jury Service for Women, 12 U.
FLA. L. REV. 224, 224-25 (1959)).
165. Id. Ballard marked the first time the Court questioned the fairness of excluding
women from juries. Id. at 1424 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 189-90
(1946)). By relying on its supervisory power, the Ballard Court held that federal courts
could not exclude women from the venire. Id.; see also supra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
166. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1423. In Hoyt, for example, "the Court found it
reasonable, 'despite the enlightened emancipation of women,' to exempt women from
mandatory jury service by statute, allowing women to serve on juries only if they
volunteered to serve." Id. at 1424 (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61 (1961)).
The Court's reasoning changed in Taylor, and a similar statute exempting women was
struck down: "'Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable
segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the
constitutional concept of a jury trial."' Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975)).
167. Id. at 1425.
168. Id. "We need not determine, however, whether women or racial minorities have
suffered more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of our
Nation's history. It is necessary only to acknowledge that 'our Nation has had a long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.' .. ." Id. at 1425 (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
169. Id. "While the prejudicial attitudes toward women in this country have not been
identical to those held toward racial minorities, the similarities between the experiences
of racial minorities and women, in some contexts, 'overpower those differences."' Id.
(quoting Beyond Batson, supra note 47, at 1921). The Court explained:
[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society
was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War
slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or
bring suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the
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classifications call for heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 70
Justice Blackmun narrowed the issue of the constitutionality of
gender-based peremptory strikes to only one question: "[W]hether
discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection substantially
furthers
the State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial
,7
trial." ' 1
The State explained that it used peremptory strikes against males
because it concluded that males may feel more sympathetic and
receptive to a defendant accused of fathering a child in a paternity
action. 72 Women, on the other hand, may feel more sympathetic and
receptive to the arguments of the child's mother.'
Rejecting the
State's justification for striking males, the Court stated: "We shall not
accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very
stereotype the law condemns."", 174 The State did not adequately
support the conclusion that gender predicts attitudes. 75 Even if it did,
Justice Blackmun pointed out, the State's actions would still violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 176
legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of
their own children. . . . And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote
in 1870, women were denied even that right-which is itself 'preservative of
other basic civil and political rights'-until adoption of the Nineteenth
Amendment half a century later.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Frontiero,411 U.S. at 685 (footnotes omitted)).
170. Id.
171. Id. The Court relied on Edmonson when deciding that the only legitimate
interest in the peremptory challenge is obtaining a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 1426
n.8 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991)).
172. Id. at 1426.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 1426-27. The Court pointed out that the State put forth only one study in
support of its claim. Id. at 1426 n.9. Then, the Court cited other sources which conclude
there are no significant differences between male and female jury verdicts. Id.
"Respondent offers virtually no support for the conclusion that gender alone is an
accurate predictor of juror's attitudes; yet it urges this Court to condone the same
stereotypes that justified the wholesale exclusion of women from juries and the ballot
box." Id. at 1426-27.
176. Id. at 1427. The Court explained:
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used
to justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support
discrimination on the basis of gender in jury selection. We have made
abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on
impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when
some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.
Id. at 1427 n.ll (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975))
(prohibiting a Social Security Act classification that authorized benefits to widows but
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Justice Blackmun wrote that the equal protection right to nondiscriminatory jury selection procedures belongs not only to litigants,
but also to potential jurors. 77 While prejudice in the selection of the
jury may affect other aspects of the litigant's proceeding, excluded
jurors have "practically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an
assertion of their inferiority."'' 78 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun
added, discriminatory exclusion harms the community, diminishes
public confidence 179
in the neutrality of the justice system, and stimulates
prejudicial views.

Justice Blackmun was careful to note that the Court's decision did
not eliminate the peremptory challenge. 80 Litigants may still exercise
peremptory challenges against unacceptable jurors; "gender simply
Following the Court's
may not serve as a proxy for bias. "
reasoning in Batson, Justice Blackmun indicated that a litigant objecting to a gender-based peremptory strike must make a prima facie
showing of intentional discrimination before the responding party must
offer a gender-neutral explanation.' 82
Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by reiterating that attorneys
may not exercise peremptory strikes based on gender or on the
assumption that gender causes bias. 8 3 "As with race, the 'core
not to widowers, even though the justification for the differential treatment was "not
entirely without empirical support"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201 (1976)
(holding unconstitutional an Oklahoma law that established different drinking ages for
men and women, despite the fact that the evidence supporting the differential treatment
was "not trivial in a statistical sense"). The Court explained that even if some truth is
present in stereotypes, the state must "look beyond the surface before making judgments
about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of
discrimination." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 n.il.
177. Id. at 1428 n.13. "It denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror, and, for a
woman, reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participation." Id. at 1428.
178. Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)).
179. Id. at 1427. The Court explained that cynicism is especially likely when cases
involve gender-related issues. Id.
180. Id. at 1429. The Court also pointed out that peremptory strikes may be used
against groups that are subject to rational basis equal protection analysis. Id. See also
supra note 99 for a description of rational basis equal protection analysis. Furthermore,
prosecutors can exercise peremptory challenges based on characteristics that are
associated more with one gender than the other, provided there is no showing of pretext.
J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1429. For example, challenging all those who have had military
experience would affect men more than women, while challenging all nurses would affect
women more than men. Id. at 1429 n.16.
181. Id. at 1429.
182. Id. "When an explanation is required, it need not rise to the level of a 'for cause'
challenge; rather, it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and
the proffered explanation may not be pretextual." Id. at 1430.
183. Id.
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guarantee of equal protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not
discriminate . .. ., would be meaningless were we to approve the

such assumptions, which arise
exclusion of jurors on the basis of
84
[gender].""9
jurors'
the
from
solely
C. The ConcurringOpinions
Justice O'Connor pointed out both the beneficial and the harmful
aspects of the Court's decision in her concurring opinion.1 85 While
she agreed that the State had not supported its gender-based peremptory challenges with the "exceedingly persuasive" justification
necessary under heightened equal protection scrutiny, 86 she disagreed
that gender does not affect one's attitude.187 A litigant's ability to act
''on sometimes accurate gender-based assumptions about juror
attitudes" is now diminished.' 88 Furthermore, this decision burdens
the trial process.8 9 In light of these disadvantages, Justice O'Connor
urged the Court to limit the decision to the government's exercise of
peremptory challenges, and not to apply it to civil litigants or criminal
defendants. 90
Also concurring, Justice Kennedy stated that precedent supported
the Court's holding. 9' Justice Kennedy reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause protects individuals, not groups.' 92 He further emphasized that race-motivated and gender-motivated peremptory challenges

184. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986)).
185. Id. at 1430-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 1430 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
187. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J.,
We know that like race, gender matters .... Moreover, though there have been
no similarly definitive studies regarding, for example, sexual harassment,
child custody, or spousal or child abuse, one need not be a sexist to share the
intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience
will be relevant to his or her view of the case.
Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. Id. (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
189. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor pointed out that "'Batson
mini-hearings" and "Batson appeals" are now common, and that J.E.B. may result in an
even greater impact on the court system. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained that gender
classifications have been subjected to heightened scrutiny for over 20 years and that
there is a strong presumption that gender classifications are invalid. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). He also pointed out that no member of the Court disputed that fact. Id.
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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reduce citizens to "components of a racial [or] sexual... class.'

93

D. The DissentingOpinions
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by discussing the
differences between race and gender discrimination. 94 He first noted
that women do not constitute a numerical minority, as racial groups
do, and then explained that women's fight for equality has not been as
difficult.'95 He also explained that the Fourteenth Amendment
primarily concerns race) 96
Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that because gender produces a
difference in outlook, the exercise of peremptory challenges in
recognition of sex differences is not a "derogatory and invidious
act.' 97 With these considerations in mind, Chief Justice Rehnquist
believed that "the balance should tilt in favor of peremptory challenges
when sex, not race, is the issue."' 98
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, wrote a separate dissent which accused the majority of being
more concerned with the appearance of the Court than with the actual
issue.' 99 The historical review of women as jurors, he believed, was
wholly irrelevant because the striking of men and not women was
mainly at issue. 20 0 Besides, Justice Scalia added, if there is no
scientific support for a difference in attitudes, the defendant is not

193. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
194. Id. at 1434 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist believes that Batson and its
progeny, which rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, were properly confined to the area
of race-based peremptory challenges. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "The two sexes differ, both biologically and,
to a diminishing extent, in experience. It is not merely 'stereotyping' to say that these
differences may produce a difference in outlook which is brought to the jury room." Id.
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist believed the State had
shown that gender-based peremptory challenges "'substantially further"' the State's
interest in a fair and impartial trial. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-20 (1965)).
199. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Today's opinion is an inspiring
demonstration of how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in
matters pertaining to the sexes (or as the Court would have it, the genders), and how
sternly we disapprove the male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
200. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun noted
that equal protection protects both men and women. Id. at 1427-28.
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injured if the jury is all male or all female.2 ' Next, he argued that the
peremptory challenge does not deny any group equal protection
because everyone is subject to its exercise. 0 2 The system is thus
",even-handed."203
Justice Scalia distinguished this issue from the total exclusion of
women from jury service.20 4 He noted that states previously denied
women access to jury service because of society's belief that females
were incompetent. 0 5 In contrast, attorneys exercise peremptory
challenges to exclude potential jurors who may not seem favorable to a
particular case.206 Thus, he articulated: "There is discrimination and
dishonor in the former, and not in the latter." 20 7
Justice Scalia predicted that the Court's holding will have negative
consequences.2°? He believed that the reasoning employed by the
Court will spread to encompass other group classifications. 20 9 Even if
this is not the case, he added, the Court's decision damages the
character of the peremptory challenge because when a peremptory
challenge can no longer be exercised with full freedom it fails its
purpose.10 Justice Scalia further asserted that criminal defendants will
suffer most because they will now have to accept jurors whom they
mistrust.2 1' Finally, Justice Scalia warned that the Court's decision
will impose substantial burdens on the justice system. 1 2

201. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting). While the State struck men, J.E.B. struck women.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). He accused the majority of focusing on the
individual peremptory challenge, rather than the system as a whole. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
204. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
206. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
207. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). All peremptory challenges are based on group
characteristics that can be considered "'stereotypes."' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Freedom is lost when prosecutors must give reasons
for their strikes. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Collateral litigation will increase because
"every case contains a potential sex-based claim," and voir dire will be lengthened. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS

The Court's decision in J.E.B. arose from a focus on the juror.1 3
Batson and its progeny gradually set the stage for J.E.B. by shifting
the focus away from the defendant to the excluded juror.1 4 As jurors,
both African-Americans and women share a remarkably similar history
of exclusion. 2 5 Therefore, the J.E.B. Court could not justify its
Batson prohibition against race-based peremptory strikes without
similarly prohibiting gender-based peremptory strikes. 1 6 Accordingly, using heightened equal protection scrutiny long applied to
gender classifications, 21 7 the Court invalidated gender-based peremptory strikes. 1 8
Nevertheless, Batson and J.E.B., decided under Fourteenth
Amendment analysis, conflict with the fair cross section cases2,9
decided under Sixth Amendment analysis.
While Batson and
J.E.B. reject race or gender stereotyping, the fair cross section cases
are riddled with assumptions and stereotypes that Batson and J.E.B.
reject.
In short, the Court attempts to have the best of both worlds
by relying on stereotypes in some circumstances, and prohibiting their
use in others.
A. Application of Equal Protection
The J.E.B. decision is consistent with over twenty years of equal
protection precedent in which the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
gender-based classifications. 2 When evaluating equal protection
challenges, a court focuses on the individual's rights.223 Accordingly,
when evaluating gender-based peremptory strikes under the Equal
Protection Clause, a court focuses on the individual juror and applies
21 3. Barbara A. Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury
Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1160-61 (1992) (arguing for the juror's rights).
214. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
215. Id. at 1425.
216. Id. at 1427.
217. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
218. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
219. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the fair cross section
cases).
220. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV.
129, 173 (1990) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (discussing the tension between Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990)); see also
infra notes 253-75 and accompanying text (explaining that Batson and J.E.B.
apparently conflict with Holland).
221. See, e.g., infra notes 253-75 and accompanying text.
222. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1433 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
223. See id. at 1433-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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heightened scrutiny.224 In concluding that gender discrimination in
jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,225 the J.E.B. Court invoked the underlying theory of Batson v.
Kentucky:226 "Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on
an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to
consider evidence presented at a trial." 2'
The reasoning in Batson, based on the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of equal protection, led to the J.E.B. Court's invalidation of
gender-based peremptory challenges. 22 ' Batson involved an AfricanAmerican defendant's objection to the removal of African-American
jurors.22 ' The Court has historically recognized an African-American
defendant's unique need for special protection.2 30 However, the
Batson Court also considered the rights of excluded jurors. 23 The
Court determined that removing a juror on account of race or racial
stereotypes violated that individual juror's equal protection rights.232
Once a background feature, concern for the individual juror's equal
protection rights has now moved to the forefront in Batson and subsequent cases. 3
224. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
225. See id. at 1430.
226. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419.
227. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (citing Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 22324 (1946)).
228. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
229. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
230. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-12 (1879). In
describing the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court commented:
[lit require[s] little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who
had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive
dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the
distinctions that had before existed. Discriminations against them had been
habitual .... The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that
condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior
intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as such they
needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who are
unable to protect themselves.
Id. at 306; see also, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 83-89 (describing the period after Strauder
as one in which the Court made unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination in
venire selection procedures, and citing cases in support of this proposition).
231. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
232. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98.
233. See J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-28 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991)); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992); Edmonson v. Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614 (1991); Babcock, supra note 213, at 1142; Sheri Lynn Johnson, The
Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 21, 76-79 (1993) (offering persuasive criticism of the Court's focus on the juror);
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It was this added focus on the individual juror, rather than the sole
focus on the defendant, that led the Supreme Court to declare genderbased peremptory challenges unconstitutional.234 The Court rejected
the respondent's argument that gender-based peremptory strikes are
permissible even though race-based peremptory strikes are not.235 In
response to this argument, the Court explained that the analogy
between African-Americans and women with respect to jury service is
strong. 23 6 Both African-Americans and women have a history of

blatant exclusion.237 Such exclusion is particularly significant because
jury service, like voting, is one of the few opportunities for a citizen to
participate in the democratic process.238 Jury service is a fundamental
aspect of full citizenship.2 9 Community inclusion and equality lie at
the heart of our democratic society's promise of equal protection. 24
Justice Scalia's argument that gender-based peremptory strikes are
not discriminatory because all groups are equally subjected to the
peremptory challenge 24 is reminiscent of the separate-but-equal
242 In fact, his argument
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.
is insupportable because the Court has rejected the argument that racial
Beyond Batson, supra note 47, at 1921-22 n.16.
234. Babcock, supra note 213, at 1160.
235. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
236. Id.
237. See supra part II.B-C.
238. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1430 (explaining the connection between jury
duty and the democratic process) (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 407).
239. See Beyond Batson, supra note 47, at 1928-30 (discussing jury participation as
an attribute of citizenship); Babcock, supra note 213, at 1165 (explaining how jury
service, along with voting, was a'primary goal of the woman suffragists); see also supra
notes 16-22 and accompanying text (describing the importance of jury service).
240. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. The Court stated:
When persons are excluded from participation in our democratic processes
solely because of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the
integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized.
In view of these concerns, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits
discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption
that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other than
the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man.
Id. (citations omitted).
241. Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Since all groups are subject to the
peremptory challenge (and will be made the object of it, depending upon the nature of
the particular case) it is hard to see how any group is denied equal protection." Id. (citing
Powers, 499 U.S. at 423-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Batson, 476 U.S. at 137-38
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
242. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); see Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. 537). In Plessy, the Court
upheld a state statute requiring the segregation of African-Americans and whites on
railroad cars on the theory the facilities were "separate but equal." 163 U.S. at 550-52.
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classifications are permissible based on the assumption that all persons
suffer equally.243 Furthermore, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, "' [alt
the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the
simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial [or] sexual... class."244
Contrary to Justice Scalia's theory, it is irrelevant that attorneys will
strike both men and women from juries solely because of their gender.
The reasons behind these peremptory strikes may reinforce discriminatory stereotypes 245 and cause ultimate harm which may or may
not be equal.246 Furthermore, the fact that the system as a whole is
even-handed does not console the individual juror summoned to the
courthouse, subjected to open and public sexism, and then dismissed
as unworthy solely because of gender.247 Thus, in finding genderbased peremptory strikes violative of equal protection, the Court's
decision is consistent with precedent.
B. Consistency and Conflict With the Fair
Cross Section Cases
The decision in J.E.B. supports the goal of the fair cross section
cases, which strive to ensure a fair and impartial jury. 248 As recently
as 1990, in Holland v. Illinois,249 the Court held that the Sixth Amend243. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410. "This idea has no place in our modem equal
protection jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become
legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them in equal degree." Id. (citing
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
244. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))
(alteration in original). See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
245. Id. at 1427. "When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of
men and women." Id.
246. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). As a result of stereotypical
notions that women are naturally delicate and in need of protection, women were denied
the right to hold office, bring suit in their own name, hold or convey property, and vote.
Id. at 685. Today, effects of stereotypes continue to pervade educational institutions,
the job market, and the political arena. Id. at 686-87; cf. Richard A. Wasserstrom,
Racism, Sexism and PreferentialTreatment: An Approach to Topics, 24 UCLA L. REV.
581, 600 (1977) (suggesting that Brown v. Board of Education may have been motivated
by the tacit recognition that African-American schools were almost always inferior).
247. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14.
248. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fair cross
section cases. See also Deborah L. Forman, Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 55-56 (1992) (discussing how Batson may indirectly further jury
impartiality by ensuring representativeness); Beyond Batson, supra note 47, at 1931-34
(explaining that gender-based peremptory challenges do not promote jury impartiality).
249. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
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ment guarantee of an impartial trial requires the jury venire to be
selected from a representative cross section of the community.250 The
fair-cross-section requirement prevented the exclusion of distinct
groups from the jury venire. 25' Thus, prior to Batson and J.E.B., the
State could still use race-based or sex-based peremptory challenges to
prevent members of these groups from actually serving on a petit
jury. 252

While Batson and J.E.B. support the goal of the fair cross section
cases, nagging discrepancies still exist. In Holland, the Court pointed
out that a representative jury venire assures impartiality by preventing
the State from securing a group of jurors "disproportionately ill
disposed towards one or all classes of defendants. 2 3 This statement
necessarily presumes that particular groups may be partial to a certain
class of individuals. Batson and J.E.B., on the other hand, reject the
assumption that a juror is partial because of membership within a
particular race or gender group.254
In sum, Holland rejected a claim that race-based peremptory
challenges violate the Sixth Amendment by denying a "fair possibility"
of a representative petit jury. 255 The Holland Court explained that
while the Sixth Amendment requires a representative jury venire,256 the
Court has never held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the exercise
of peremptory challenges to exclude members from the petit jury.2 57
According to Justice Scalia, this serves the Sixth Amendment by

250. Id. at 480.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 477-78. Contra id. at 514-15 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). Dissenting in
Holland, Justice Stevens argued that the Sixth Amendment should prevent the use of
discriminatory peremptory challenges in selecting the petit jury:
"The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the accused an 'impartial jury,' not just an impartial jury venire.
." Id. at 514 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 480.
254. See supra notes 116, 174-76, and accompanying text.
255. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478.
256. Id. at 480. While describing how an impartial jury is viewed, the Court returned
to Swain:
[The peremptory challenge] is often exercised . . . on grounds normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race,
religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury
duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not
whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether
one from a different group is less likely to be.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting with approval Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
220-21 (1965)).
257. Id. at 481.
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"'eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides."' 258 Again, this
view directly conflicts with Batson and J.E.B., which reject the
assumption that a juror is partial because of membership within a
particular race or gender group.25 9 Thus, the Court's Sixth Amendment interpretation in Holland seems to encourage what equal
protection prohibits.26
Dissenting in Holland, Justice Stevens attempted to reconcile the
conflict by maintaining that discriminatory peremptory challenges
violate both the Sixth and the Fourteenth Amendments.26' Justice
Stevens explained that the fair-cross-section requirement, implied
through the Sixth Amendment,2262 requires use of a "neutral selection
mechanism to generate a jury representative of the community ' 263 and
that a representative jury helps ensure inclusion of a variety of group
perspectives.2 6
Furthermore, Justice Stevens explained, the truth-seeking process is
enhanced when the diverse views of the community are included.265
The inclusion of different perspectives thus helps to serve a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.2 66 In the

meantime, Justice Stevens argued that Batson's equal protection rule is
complementary.267 Discriminatory peremptory challenges interfere
with a defendant's chance to obtain a representative jury. 268 If the
"selection procedure, 269 is discriminatory under equal protection
because "'strikes were based on the belief that no black citizen could
be a satisfactory juror or fairly try' the case, 21 ° the "same showing
258. Id. at 484 (alteration in original) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 219).
259. See supra notes 116, 174-76, and accompanying text.
260. See Leading Cases, supra note 220, at 173.
261. 493 U.S. at 505-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 513 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting VAN DYKE, supra note 23, at
18).
265. See id. at 515 (Stevens, J.,dissenting). "[Bly providing that juries be drawn
through fair and neutral selection procedures from a broad cross section of the
community, [the Sixth] Amendment insures a jury that will best reflect the views of the
community-one that is not arbitrarily skewed for or against any particular group or
characteristic." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Barbara Underwood, Ending Race
Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right is it, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725,
749 (1992) (arguing that exclusion of distinct groups causes "impoverished
factfinding").
266. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 515 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 101).
270. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87).
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necessarily establishes that the defendant does not have a fair possibility of obtaining a representative cross section for Sixth
Amendment purposes. 27 ' Justice Stevens' analysis could also apply
to gender.
Justice Stevens' reconciliation is problematic, however, because
generalizations about group perspectives also involve stereotypes. 72
It is unclear why stereotypes can be used to conclude that perspectives
differ, but cannot be used to conclude that these different perspectives
may cause a white juror to disfavor an African-American defendant, a
female juror to disfavor a male defendant, and so forth. 3 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor has indicated that both race and gender affect
impartiality.2 74 Refusing to permit litigants to exercise race-based and
gender-based peremptory challenges is not a denial of this fact, she
reasoned, but is instead a "special
rule of relevance, a statement about
' 275
what this Nation stands for.
C. The Status of the Peremptory Challenge
Currently, the rights of jurors are not threatened to the point of
eliminating all peremptory challenges. The Court avoided taking on
the peremptory challenge issue as a whole,27 6 and chose instead to
assail only pieces of the overall practice.277 Previously, in Swain v.
Alabama, the scales were weighted in favor of the peremptory
challenge.279 Under Swain's rationale, in any given case, prosecutors

27 1. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 233, at 79-80.
273. Id. at 80. In the context of race, Professor Johnson points out that assumptions
about different experiences and knowledge are related to assumptions about impartiality:
To the extent black jurors as a group have had different experiences of racism
than white jurors as a group, they are more likely to differ in their readiness to
convict an accused black defendant. The first example that comes to mind
concerns experiences of police brutality and racial hostility: jurors with these
experiences are likely to view police testimony in resisting arrest cases with
greater skepticism.
Id.
274. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
275. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940,
942 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in denial of certiorari)).
276. Id. at 1425. "In making this assessment, we do not weigh the value of
peremptory challenges as an institution against our asserted commitment to eradicate
invidious discrimination from the courtroom." Id. at 1425-26.
277. Only peremptory challenges based on gender were examined. Id. at 1426.
278. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Swain.
279. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986).
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could remove jurors for whatever reason and without question. 2 0 As
a result, equal protection applied only in theory.21
Subsequently, in Batson and in J.E.B., the Court applied the Equal
Protection Clause to reject the State's explanation for race-based 282 and
gender-based strikes. 28 3 By prohibiting only race-based and genderbased strikes, the Court has only weakened the peremptory challenge
to the extent required to give life to equal protection. Thus, rather than
abolish the peremptory challenge in its entirety, 284 the Court attempted
to achieve a balance between the litigant's interest in the peremptory
challenge as a means to an impartial jury and the juror's interest in
equal protection.
Dissenting in Batson, Chief Justice Burger claimed that the
peremptory challenge either exists or it does not: "Analytically, there
is no middle ground. ' 285 If peremptory challenges must be explained,
they are no longer,,211
peremptory,2 6 but instead "collapse into the
challenge for cause.
Justice O'Connor expressed similar views in
J.E.B. when she explained that unlike challenges for cause,
peremptory challenges are often based on intuition, hunches, and inarticulable reasons. 288 Litigants may be unable to verbalize an
acceptable race- or gender-neutral explanation even if their reasons do
not relate to these factors.289
Nevertheless, the majority insists that after J.E.B., the peremptory
strike still has force. 290 First, the party challenging the strike must
make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the
court will require that the attorney exercising the strike give an
280. 380 U.S. at 220.
281. Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Martin, 336 A.2d 290, 295 (Pa. 1975)). Justice Marshall described Swain's burden of
proof as one which required that "'justice ... sit supinely by' and be flouted in case after
case before a remedy is available." Id.
282. Id. at 89.
283. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
284. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
285. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
286. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 222).
287. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679,
682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
288. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Our belief that
experienced lawyers will often correctly intuit which jurors are likely to be the least
sympathetic, and our understanding that the lawyer will often be unable to explain the
intuition, are the very reason we cherish the peremptory challenge." Id. at 1431
(O'Connor, J.,concurring).
289. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 1429.
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explanation.29 ' "When an explanation is required, it need not rise to
the level of a 'for cause' challenge; rather, it merely must be based on a
juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation
may not be pretextual. '292 Also, an attorney may remove members of
groups that are subject to "rational basis" review.293 Furthermore, an
attorney may base strikes on factors that are disproportionately
associated with one gender. 294 Thus, while acknowledging the
continued existence of the peremptory challenge, a majority of the
Court felt it reasonable to require a neutral explanation for an apparently discriminatory peremptory strike.295
V. IMPACT

J.E.B., along with Batson and its progeny, will impact everyone
considered in the opinions: the community, the jurors, and the defendants. The nondiscriminatory rules of Batson and J.E.B. will
enhance community confidence in the justice system. 296 The issues
surrounding discriminatory peremptory challenges, however, do not
end there. Courts will likely extend Batson and J.E.B., and it is
questionable whether or not the peremptory challenge will survive.
A. Community Confidence in the JudicialSystem
An important factor in the Court's decision in Batson and J.E.B.
was confidence in the judicial system.297 Consistent with democratic
concepts, the American public envisions a proper jury as representative
of the community, and not comprised of any certain group or class.2 98
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1430.
293. Id. at 1429 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439-42 (1985) (explaining that under "rational review," classifications are sustained if
"rationally related to a legitimate state interest")).
294. Id. The Court stated that these strikes may be appropriate as long as there is not
a showing of pretext. Id.
295. Id.
296. Cf.id. at 1427 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991)) (stating that
discriminatory peremptory challenges risk "creating the impression that the judicial
system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender.").
297. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 (stating that "[tihe community is harmed by the
State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the
inevitable loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination
in the courtroom engenders."); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (stating that "[s]election
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.") (citing McCray v. New York, 461
U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall, J.,dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)).
298. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (quoting Glasser v. United
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Discriminatory jury selection undermines confidence in the jury's
neutrality, its ability to adhere to the law, and the fairness of the verdict
it determines.2 9 By rendering discriminatory peremptory challenges
illegal, Batson and J.E.B. will improve the appearance of the judicial
system.
Confidence in the judicial system is also increased by the fact that
courts are taking steps to eliminate discrimination within the jury
selection procedure. 3" Courts enforce antidiscrimination laws in
almost every other major institution. 30 ' The moral authority to police
others for compliance is302strengthened when courts apply the same
standards to themselves.
One could argue that the public is unaware of discrimination because
litigants are not required to explain the basis for peremptory challenges. In a much-cited article, Professor Babcock praised the
peremptory challenge as a means to allow "covert expression of what
we dare not say but know is true more often than not. ' 30 3 She later
acknowledged, however, that she failed to recognize that "tides of
racial passion swept through the courtroom when peremptory
challenges were exercised.,, 3°4 Babcock contends that citizens know
what is happening. 305 This belief has also been expressed by the
Supreme Court. 306 In Powers v. Ohio,30 7 Justice Kennedy explained
States, 315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942)).
299. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 412).
300. See Underwood, supra note 265, at 749 (stating that discrimination in the jury
selection process decreases public confidence in the judicial system).
301. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (state actors); Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(0 (1988) (lenders); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1988) (places of public accommodation); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988) (employers); Fair Housing Act of
1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988) (providers of housing for sale or rent)).
302. See id.
303. Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 554 (1975), quoted with approval in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 121
(1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
304. Babcock, supra note 213, at 1147. For example, an excluded juror wrote a
District Attorney the following letter:
If we Blacks don't have common sense and don't know how to be fair and
impartial, why send these summonses to us? Why are we subject to fines of
$250.00 if we don't appear and told it's our civic duty if we ask to be excused?
Why bother to call us down to these courts and then overlook us like a bunch
of naive or better yet ignorant children? We could be on our jobs or in schools
trying to help ourselves instead of in courthouse halls being made fools of.
Amicus Brief for Elizabeth Holtzman at 18, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(No. 84-6263), quoted in Underwood, supra note 265, at 725.
305. Babcock, supra note 213, at 1147.
306. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1428 ("The message it sends to all those in the
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that "[a] venireperson excluded from jury service because of race
suffers a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public
character."3 °s
The composition of the jury is important to the American public.309
It is common for newspapers to report the race and gender of jury
members. 3'0 As the J.E.B. Court pointed out, the practice of using
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion contributes to the
suspicion that the "'deck has been stacked' in favor of one side."3 1 '
By banning discriminatory peremptory challenges, the Court enhances
community confidence in the judicial system. 2
B. Extension of J.E.B.
Like Batson, courts will likely extend J.E.B. to invalidate more than
the prosecutors' discriminatory peremptory challenges in criminal
cases. The Court was quick to apply Batson's prohibition against
race-based peremptory challenges to defendants in addition to prosecutors.3 13 The Court determined that the same harms to the juror and
community occur whether a state or a defendant exercises the
discriminatory peremptory challenge. 3 4 The Court viewed the
defendant as a state actor for purposes of applying Batson because the
peremptory challenge involves state action.31 5 The same reasoning
courtroom, and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain
individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to
decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree."); Batson,
476 U.S. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Misuse of the peremptory challenge to
exclude black jurors has become both common and flagrant.").
307. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
308. Id. at 413-14.
309. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
310. See, e.g., id. at 2360 & n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (commenting that race is
regularly noted by newspapers and referring to a computer search which revealed "that
the phrase 'all white jury' has appeared over two hundred times in the past five years in
the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times").
311. 114 S. Ct. at 1427 (citing Powers, 499 U.S. at 412).
312. See supra note 297.
313. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353. After dedicating a major portion of her
concurrence to explaining why Batson should not have been extended, Justice O'Connor
then predicted that J.E.B. will also be extended. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432-33
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
314. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2353.
315. Id. at 2355 (citing Edmonson v. Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)). In his
analysis, Justice Blackmun relied on Edmonson:
[T]he Edmonson Court found that the peremptory challenge system, as well as
the jury system, as a whole, 'simply could not exist' without the 'overt and
significant participation of the government.'. . . [P]eremptory challenges
perform a traditional function of the government: 'Their sole purpose is to
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applies equally to gender-based peremptory challenges." 6
A more uncertain question is whether courts will extend the rule of
Batson and J.E.B. beyond race and sex. In his dissent to J.E.B.,
Justice Scalia emphasized that all peremptory challenges are at risk
because they are all based on stereotypes of some kind.317 So far,31the
8
Court has not altered the balance it created with Batson and J.E.B.
For example, the Court recently refused to review a case involving a
peremptory strike based on religion. In State v. Davis, 319 the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on religious grounds.32°
When challenged, the prosecutor explained that, in her experience,
Jehovah's Witnesses were reluctant to exercise authority over
others.32' The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to apply Batson,
reasoning that religious discrimination was less historically pervasive
than racial discrimination. 322 The United States Supreme Court denied
permit litigants to assist the government in the selection of an impartial trier
of fact.'. . . [T]he courtroom setting in which the peremptory challenge is
exercised intensifies the harmful effects of the private litigant's
discriminatory act and contributes to its characterization as state action.
Id. at 2355-56. Contra J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)); McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2363
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor reiterated her objections to Edmonson and
McCollum, including the fact that states and criminal defendants are naturally
"antagonistic" to each other. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J.,concurring).
316. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2353 n.4 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall,
J.,concurring) (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)).
317. J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Since all groups are subject
to the peremptory challenge (and will be made the object of it, depending upon the
nature of the particular case) it is hard to see how any group is denied equal protection."
Id. at 1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
318. Id. at 1428 n.14. The Court pointed out that other groups have not experienced
the degree of discrimination that African-Americans and women have:
The popular refrain is that all peremptory challenges are based on stereotypes
of some kind, expressing various intuitive and frequently erroneous biases.
But where peremptory challenges are made on the basis of group
characteristics other than race or gender (like occupation, for example), they
do not reinforce the same stereotypes about the group's competence or
predispositions that have been used to prevent them from voting,
participating on juries, pursuing their chosen professions, or otherwise
contributing to civic life.
Id. (citing Babcock, supra note 213, at 1173).
319. 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
320. Id. at 768.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 770-71. "[Tlhere is no indication that irrational religious bias so
pervades the peremptory challenge as to undermine the integrity of the jury system." Id.
at 771. "To extend Batson . . .would not serve to remedy any long-standing injustice
perpetrated by the court system against specific individuals and classes, as Batson
clearly does." Id, The Minnesota Supreme Court also made two other key observations,
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certiorari.323
In dissent to the denial of certiorari, Justices Thomas and Scalia
argued that, given the Court's reasoning in J.E.B., no sound reason
exists for allowing religious-based peremptory challenges.324 Religious-based classifications, like gender-based classifications, are
subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny.325 The dissenting
justices did not deny that religious discrimination has not been as
pervasive as race discrimination, but argued that J.E.B. disavowed the
understanding that Batson does not apply "[o]utside the uniquely
sensitive area of race .... ,326
Neither the Minnesota Supreme Court nor the dissents to the denial
of certiorari address the fact that the First Amendment specifically
addresses religion.327 Courts have interpreted the two religion clauses
according to Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence in denial of certiorari. Davis, 114 S.
Ct. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J.,concurring in denial of certiorari). First, "religious affiliation
(or lack thereof) is not as self-evident as race or gender." Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771,
quoted in Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
Second:
"Ordinarily .... inquiry on voir dire into a juror's religious affiliation and
beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions is improper....
[P]roper questioning.., should be limited to asking jurors if they knew of any
reason why they could not sit, if they would have any difficulty in following
the law as given by the court, or if they would have any difficulty in sitting in
judgment."
Id. at 772, quoted in Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari) (citations omitted).
323. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120.
324. Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting). "I can only conclude that the Court's
decision to deny certiorari stems from an unwillingness to confront forthrightly the
ramifications of the decision in J.E.B." Id. at 2122 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Batson, 476 U.S. at 124 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Dissenting in Davis, Justice Thomas stated:
In breaking the barrier between classifications that merit strict equal
protection scrutiny and those that receive what we have termed 'heightened' or
'intermediate' scrutiny, J.E.B. would seem to have extended Batson's equal
protection analysis to all strikes based on the latter category. of
classifications-a category which presumably would include classifications
based on religion.
Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cf. Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982)).
326. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2121 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Davis, 504
N.W.2d at 771-72 (quoting Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940, 942 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in denial of certiorari))).
327. See Recent Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1164, 1166 (1994) (pointing out that the
Minnesota Supreme Court ignored the First Amendment's specific protection of,
religious freedom) [hereinafter Recent Cases]. The First Amendment reads: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
" U.S. CONST. amend. I.
exercise thereof ....
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of the First Amendment as commanding governmental neutrality
toward religious affiliation.3 28 In McDaniel v. Paty,329 the Court
determined that the "government may not use religion as a basis of
classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges, or
benefits. ' 330 One could argue that religious-based peremptory challenges violate the First Amendment by removing certain individuals
from jury service solely because of their religion or the stereotypes
associated with their religion. 331 Accordingly, the argument successfully made in J.E.B. may logically lead to a prohibition against
religious-based peremptory challenges.332
C. The Future of the Peremptory Challenge
The future of the peremptory challenge is questionable. If the Court
extends Batson and J.E.B. beyond race and gender, it will strip the
peremptory challenge of its power, layer by layer.333 In short, under
the Court's recent decisions, equal protection will continuously be at
odds with "'an arbitrary and capricious right"' like the peremptory
challenge. 34
In addition, peremptory challenges based on race and gender did not
necessarily end with Batson and J.E.B.3 35 Justice Marshall argued
328. Recent Cases, supra note 327, at 1166. "The [religion clauses] should be read as
stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action
or inaction because these clauses . . .prohibit classification in terms of religion to
confer a benefit or impose a burden." Id. at 1166 n.29 (alteration in original) (quoting
PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962), quoted in WILLIAM B. LOCKHART
ET AL., CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1241 (5th ed. 1980)).
329. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
330. Id. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring) (invalidating a Tennessee law preventing
clergy from holding public office), quoted in Recent Cases, supra note 327, at 1167.
331. Recent Cases, supra note 327, at 1167.
332. See Davis, 114 S.Ct. at 2121-22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that there is
no sound reason not to prohibit religion-based peremptory challenges after the decision
in J.E.B.); Recent Cases, supra note 327, at 1169 (arguing that the First Amendment
prohibits religion-based peremptory challenges).
333. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1438-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
claims that prohibiting even race- and gender-based strikes damages the character of the
peremptory challenge. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
334. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 123 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892))). Chief Justice Burger warned that
"unadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory
challenges exercised in any particular case. A clause that requires minimum 'rationality'
in government actions has no application to 'an arbitrary and capricious right."' Id.
(Burger, C.J., dissenting); see infra notes 340-41 and accompanying text for the Court's
comments that the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional right.
335. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J.,concurring).
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that the only way to eliminate discrimination is to prohibit the
peremptory challenge altogether.33 6 He explained that challenges must
be flagrant in order to establish a prima facie case under Batson.3"
Furthermore, attorneys have offered a number of purportedly
legitimate reasons to explain peremptory strikes which in reality are a
mere pretext for intentional discrimination.338 The attorneys and
judges themselves may be affected by unconscious racism or sexism,
and may not recognize that they are acting in a discriminatory manner
or permitting its occurrence. 339 Therefore, race-based and genderbased peremptory challenges are still at issue.
In final analysis, however, it must be recognized that equal
protection is a constitutional command, while the peremptory challenge
is not. 34° As such, the constitutional command of equal protection
336. Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring). Relying on the experience of states which
had a Batson rule, Justice Marshall indicated that prosecutors may avoid suspicion by
keeping race-based peremptory challenges to an "'acceptable' level." Id. (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
338. Id. at 105-06 (Marshall, J., concurring); see, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 937
F.2d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir. 1991) (allowed to strike juror because she was living with her
fiancee), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 989 (1992); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 1243,
1247 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowed to strike juror because prosecutor had convicted an
unrelated defendant who lived in the same area as the juror), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1279
(1992); United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1991) (allowed to strike
young single mother because she may have "other concerns"); United States v.
Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowed to strike juror because of age,
residence, and type of employment); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 744 (3d
Cir.) (allowed to strike black jurors because of age and marital status), cert. denied, 488
U.s 835 (1988).
See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards for
assessing a prima facie case under Batson. Once a prima facie case has been established,
a neutral explanation may be offered, and the trial court determines if purposeful
discrimination has been established. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
339. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). "A prosecutor's own
conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a
prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,' a characterization that would not have
come to mind if a white juror had acted identically." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
340. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also
pointed out that the Court has repeatedly stated that the peremptory challenge is not a
constitutional right. Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring). Also, in Georgia v.
McCollum, the Court stated:
The final question is whether the interests served by Batson must give way to
the rights of a criminal defendant. As a preliminary matter, it is important to
recall that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state-created means to the
constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial. This Court repeatedly
has stated that the right to a peremptory challenge may be withheld altogether
without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair
trial.
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supersedes the peremptory challenge.34' In sum, the balance that the
Court seeks may gradually lean toward equal protection until the
peremptory challenge is abolished.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in J.E.B. constitutes strike two for the peremptory challenge. By applying heightened equal protection analysis
and by focusing on the jurors rather than solely on the defendant, the
Court found gender-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional. It
would be very difficult to justify prohibiting race-based peremptory
challenges, but not gender-based peremptory challenges, when
African-Americans and women share a remarkably similar history of
exclusion from jury service.
Nevertheless, the issues arising from discriminatory peremptory
challenges do not end there. The Court has not yet reconciled the
inconsistencies between its philosophy in the fair cross section cases
and its reasoning in Batson and J.E.B. Furthermore, it is likely that
the Court will extend Batson and J.E.B. until the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection commands the abolishment of the peremptory challenge.
ANNA M. SCRUGGS

112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357-58 (1992) (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965);
Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.1 1 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299
U.S. 123, 145 (1936); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
341. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
"'[W]ere it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have
a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former."' Id.
(Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, J., dissenting)).

